[HGI-news-int] HGI Seminar on March 13th: "A Unified Framework for Anal. of Side-Channel Key Rec. Attacks" by Dr. F.-X. Standaert (UC Louvain)

[English Newsletter of the Horst Gö rtz Institute of IT Security in Bochum]

Hallo,

we would like to invite You to a very interesting presentation taking
place in the framework of the research seminar of the Horst-Görz
Institute for IT Security (Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany) next week:

Speaker:     *Dr.François-Xavier Standaert (Université Catolique de
Louvain, Belgium)*
Title:           *A Unified Framework for the Analysis of Side-Channel
Key Recovery Attacks*
Abstract:     Please see below
Time:          *Thursday, March 13th, 11.00 am*
Place:         *HGI at Ruhr-University Bochum, Building IC, 4th floor,
Room 161.*

The forthcoming talk of the HGI Seminar is taking place on March 20th:
*Karsten Nohl* (University of Virginia): "*From Silicon to C: Reverse-Engineering Cryptographic Hardware*"

For more information see _http://www.hgi.rub.de/index_en.html_
__
You can find directions and hotel recommendations on _http://www.trust.rub.de/home/contact/

_If you have any further Questions please don't hesitate to contact us.


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Dr.François-Xavier Standaert, Université Catolique de Louvain, Belgium, http://www.dice.ucl.ac.be/crypto/people/show/7
Title: "A Unified Framework for the Analysis of Side-Channel Key Recovery Attacks"

Abstract:
The fair evaluation and comparison of side-channel attacks and countermeasures
has been a long standing open question, limiting further developments in the
field. Motivated by this challenge, this work proposes a framework for the
analysis of cryptographic implementations that includes a theoretical model and
an application methodology. The model is based on weak and commonly accepted
hypotheses about side-channels that computations give rise to. It allows
quantifying the effect of practically relevant leakage functions with a
combination of security and information theoretic metrics, respectively
measuring the quality of an implementation and the strength of an adversary.
>From a theoretical point of view, we demonstrate formal connections between
these metrics and discuss their intuitive meaning. From a practical point of
view, the model implies a unified methodology for the analysis of side-channel
key recovery. The proposed solution allows getting rid of most of the
subjective parameters that were limiting previous specialized and often ad hoc
approaches in the evaluation of physically observable devices. It typically
determines the extent to which basic (but practically essential) questions such
as ``How to compare two implementations?" or ``How to compare two side-channel
adversaries?" can be fairly answered. In order to justify the interest and
relevance of these theoretical results, we will cover a few applications of the
model, based upon both simulations and real measurements of cryptographic
hardware devices.

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We are lookong forward on Your comming!

Best regards,
Biljana Cubaleska


Dipl.-Ing Biljana Cubaleska
Research assistant
Chair for System Security
Ruhr-University Bochum
++49 234 / 32 27757


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